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THE PROPER APPLICATION OF NOMINATIVE 
FAIR USE IN TRADEMARK LAW: WHY 
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
SECURITY CERTIFICATION CONSORTIUM, INC. V. 
SECURITY UNIVERSITY, LLC SETS THE 
PREEMINENT STANDARD 
Jonathan Oldham Ballard Jr.* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, the iconic “Google” trademark was estimated to be 
worth forty-four billion dollars, making up twenty-seven percent of 
the tech monolith’s total market value.1 Similarly valuable 
trademarks are not uncommon.2 For many of the world’s largest 
corporations, the goodwill and consumer magnetism fostered by their 
trademarks lay the foundation for their commercial success.3 
The economic value of these marks is protected by a generally-
exclusive right to use the mark in commerce.4 However, statutory 
provisions and common law doctrines have created some exceptions 
to this general rule.5 Perhaps the most notorious of these exceptions 
is the doctrine of nominative fair use. 
Under the doctrine of nominative fair use, an alleged infringer is 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thanks to the Loyola of 
Los Angeles Law Review staff for their help in editing this article. Thanks, also, to my parents, 
Jon and Elizabeth Ballard, for their love and unrelenting encouragement throughout my journey 
to law school. 
 1. Sean Stonefield, The 10 Most Valuable Trademarks, FORBES (June 15, 2011), https:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/seanstonefield/2011/06/15/the-10-most-valuable-trademarks/#6abaf13536 
b8. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Kelvin King, The Value of Intellectual Property, Intangible Assets and Goodwill, 
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/value_ip_intangible 
_assets_fulltext.html. 
 4. Darian B. Taylor, Annotation, Nominative Fair Use Defense in Trademark Law, 84 
A.L.R. Fed. 2d 217, 234 (2015). 
 5. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(1)–(9) (2012); 3 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON 
TRADEMARKS 
§ 11.08 (2018). 
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immune from liability when the alleged infringer uses the plaintiff’s 
trademark to refer to the trademark owner or trademark owner’s 
product in a non-confusing manner.6 While this doctrine has firmly 
embedded itself into established trademark jurisprudence since its 
original articulation in the Ninth Circuit, not all circuits acknowledge 
the doctrine’s conceptual viability or implement the doctrine in the 
same way.7 
In International Information Systems Security Certification 
Consortium, Inc. v. Security University, LLC,8 the Second Circuit 
created its own nominative fair use test.9 This Comment describes 
the circuit split relating to nominative fair use, and argues that the 
Second Circuit’s nominative fair use test provides definitive 
guidance on the proper application of nominative fair use. Part II of 
this Comment discusses the Lanham Act and the standard for 
trademark infringement: likelihood of confusion. Part III discusses 
the history of nominative fair use. Part IV discusses the nominative 
fair use circuit split. Part V delves into the facts of International 
Information, and Part VI discusses why the Second Circuit’s 
nominative fair use test stands out as preeminent. Part VII suggests 
that the Supreme Court should address the nominative fair use circuit 
split on certiorari and should adopt the International Information 
nominative fair use test thereafter. 
II.  THE LANHAM ACT AND LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION 
In 1946, Congress passed the Lanham Act to delineate 
trademark owners’ rights.10 Under the Lanham Act, trademark 
owners are afforded the right to use a “distinctive mark in the course 
of commerce” and the corresponding right to enjoin or recover 
damages from parties who use an identical or confusingly similar 
mark.11 
When analyzing this likelihood of confusion, courts use one of 
several jurisdiction-specific, multi-factor balancing tests that vary in 
 
 6. 3 GILSON LALONDE, supra note 5, at § 11.08. 
 7. Taylor, supra note 4, at 234–35. 
 8. 823 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 9. Id. at 168. 
 10. Sondra Levine, The Origins of the Lanham Act, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 22, 27 
(2010). 
 11. Taylor, supra note 4, at 236. 
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length, phrasing, and organization.12 The factors that make up these 
tests include: 
(1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) 
similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; 
(5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the 
degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) 
defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood 
of expansion of the product lines.13 
Since the passage of the Lanham Act, common law development of 
trademark law has occurred in two phases.14 From roughly 1946–
1980, courts became increasingly wary of the anti-competitive 
effects of trademark monopolies and exercised greater restraint when 
extending trademark rights past those explicitly delineated in the 
Lanham Act.15 Foreshadowing the Second Circuit’s ultimate stance 
on nominative fair use, opinions from Second Circuit Judges Learned 
Hand and Jerome Frank helped to define this conservative era of 
trademark common law.16 
The 1970’s brought about a dramatic paradigm shift in 
prevailing law and economics theory.17 Concerns of trademark 
rights’ anti-competitive effects were supplanted with the theory that 
trademarks actually enhanced competition by improving the quality 
of information available to consumers.18 This more optimistic view 
of trademark law led to a more liberal expansion of trademark rights 
through common law.19 
Coinciding with this period of trademark rights expansion was a 
departure from the legal formalism that defined early, post-Lanham 
Act common law.20 The liberal and elaborate interpretations of 
Lanham Act provisions that defined this prolific era eventually led to 
the original articulation of nominative fair use in the seminal Ninth 
Circuit case, New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, 
 
 12. 2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, § 5.02 (2018). 
 13. 1 JAMES B. ASTRACHAN ET AL., THE LAW OF ADVERTISING, § 11.02 (2001). 
 14. Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark 
Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 593, 599 (2006). 
 15. Id. at 599. 
 16. Id. at 599–600. 
 17. See id. at 602–03. 
 18. Id. at 602. 
 19. Id. at 603. 
 20. Id. at 583. 
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Inc.21 
III.  THE HISTORY OF NOMINATIVE FAIR USE 
In New Kids, the Court rejected a trademark infringement claim 
brought by the famous ‘80s boy band, “New Kids on the Block,” 
against a news organization that published the band’s trademark-
protected name in its newspaper.22 The band’s name was published 
in a poll that asked subscribers to call in and respond to questions 
about members of the band, such as “[w]ho’s the best on the block?” 
and “which kid is the sexiest?”23 Believing that the polls infringed on 
their trademark, New Kids on the Block brought claims for 
trademark infringement against the news organization.24 
The court held that nominative fair use defeated the band’s 
infringement claim because: 1) the news organization only referred 
to the group’s trademarked name in order to identify it, 2) use of the 
name was the only practical way for the news organization to refer to 
the group, and 3) the use of the name was not confusing or 
suggestive that the charity event was sponsored by the musical 
group.25 A three-part nominative fair use test was extracted from this 
holding. 
Phrased in the abstract, nominative fair use applies when:  
(1) the product or service in question was . . . one not 
readily identifiable without use of the trademark; (2) only 
so much of the mark or marks was used as was reasonably 
necessary to identify the product or service; and (3) the 
defendant did nothing that would have, in conjunction with 
the mark, suggested sponsorship or endorsement by the 
owner.26 
The Ninth Circuit created this three-part, nominative fair use test 
to protect alleged trademark infringers who do not appropriate or 
obfuscate the source-identifying qualities of the mark, but to the 
contrary, use the mark specifically to identify the trademark owner.27 
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that such protection was warranted 
 
 21. 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 22. Id. at 309. 
 23. Id. at 304. 
 24. Id. at 304–05. 
 25. Id. at 308–09. 
 26. Taylor, supra note 4, at 238. 
 27. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308. 
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because this type of use was not confusing or deceptive and thus fell 
outside the bounds of trademark law protection.28 
While the creation of nominative fair use may have been 
predominantly the result of this nuanced understanding of trademark 
law’s purview as it concerned the New Kids factual background, the 
Ninth Circuit also supported its position by acknowledging 
longstanding Supreme Court precedent that recognized the legality of 
comparative advertising using trademarks.29 The rationale used to 
support nominative fair use is thus derived from the scope of 
trademark protection under the Lanham Act and an independent 
common law lineage that condones comparative advertising. 
IV.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Since New Kids, three other circuits have adopted nominative 
fair use but apply the doctrine differently.30 These competing 
adaptations of the doctrine will likely remain in effect in their 
respective circuits for the foreseeable future because the Supreme 
Court has explicitly declined to give guidance on the matter. In KP 
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.,31 the Court 
excluded any consideration of nominative fair use from its discussion 
of a similar issue concerning classic fair use.32 The lack of guidance 
on this nominative fair use issue has since left the circuit courts in 
disagreement. 
In the Ninth Circuit, the three-part nominative fair use test 
created in New Kids replaces the traditional likelihood of confusion 
test when the defense is at issue.33 The burden of proving that the 
elements of the test are unsatisfied is bestowed on the plaintiff.34  
The Fifth Circuit was the first to adopt the nominative fair use 
doctrine after its inception in the Ninth Circuit.35 In Pebble Beach 
 
 28. Id. at 308–09. 
 29. See id. at 308 (citing Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924)). 
 30. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 546 (5th Cir. 1998); Century 21 Real 
Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 217 (3d Cir. 2005); Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. 
Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 823 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 31. 543 U.S. 111 (2004). 
 32. Id. at 115 n.3. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012) creates an affirmative defense to trademark 
infringement known colloquially as “classic” or “descriptive” fair use. This defense is outside the 
scope of this Comment. 
 33. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1182 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 34. Id. at 1182–83. 
 35. Paul C. Llewellyn & Kyle D. Gooch, Second Circuit Expands Split on Nominative Fair 
Use, INTABULLETIN: INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.inta.org 
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Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd.,36 the Fifth Circuit created its own nominative 
fair use test using two of the three New Kids factors.37 Instead of 
using this test as a substitute for a likelihood of confusion analysis, 
however, courts in the Fifth Circuit analyze their two nominative fair 
use factors “in conjunction with [a] likelihood-of-confusion 
analysis.”38 The two nominative fair use factors thus function as a 
“supplement” to the circuit’s traditional, multi-factor likelihood of 
confusion test.39 
To the contrary, the Third Circuit recognizes nominative fair use 
as an affirmative defense.40 Using this approach, an affirmative 
finding of a likelihood of confusion is moot if nominative fair use is 
found using the three-part test.41 In these cases, a nominative fair use 
defense prevails regardless of the strength of the likelihood of 
confusion finding.42 
This three-way circuit split between the Ninth, Fifth, and Third 
Circuits was fragmented once again by the Second Circuit in 
International Information.43 
V.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
International Information Systems Security Certification 
Consortium (“ISC2”) is a non-profit dedicated to developing 
standards for the information security industry.44 “ISC2 developed a 
certification program and began using the certification mark 
‘CISSP®’ to denote a ‘Certified Information Systems Security 
Professional’ who has met certain requirements and standards of 
competency in the information security field.”45 ISC2 administers a 
 
/INTABulletin/Pages/Normative_Fair_Use_7120.aspx.  
 36. 155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 37. Id. at 546 & n.13. 
 38. Id. at 547. 
 39. Id. at 546. 
 40. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 217 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“[T]he legal framework still involves a showing that A’s reference to B’s mark will likely 
confuse the public, but the analysis does not end there, for the use may nonetheless be permissible 
if it is ‘fair.’”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 217–18. 
 43. Llewellyn & Gooch, supra note 35. 
 44. Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 823 F.3d 153, 156 
(2d Cir. 2016). 
 45. Id. 
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CISSP certification exam that tests these qualifications.46 
Security University (“SU”) offers classes that prepare people for 
the CISSP certification exam.47 While it was undisputed that SU was 
allowed to use the CISSP mark to indicate that its classes were 
designed to prepare students for the CISSP certification exam, ISC2 
objected to several of SU’s advertisements that featured the CISSP 
mark.48 
From 2010–2012, SU ran a variety of advertisements that 
referred to SU’s instructor, Clement DuPuis, as a “Master CISSP.”49 
ISC2 claimed that SU fabricated this “Master” designation and that 
the designation was not related to ISC2’s certification standards.50 
After an unsuccessful cease and desist request, ISC2 sued SU for 
trademark infringement on the basis that the use of the “Master” 
designation, in conjunction with the CISSP trademark, created a 
“false designation of origin.”51 
SU countered ISC2’s infringement claims by raising a 
nominative fair use defense.52 
A.  The District Court 
When assessing ISC2’s trademark infringement claim, the 
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut applied 
the three-part nominative fair use test from New Kids instead of the 
Second Circuit’s traditional, multi-factor likelihood of confusion 
test.53 The district court held that, per this three-part test, SU’s use of 
the CISSP mark constituted nominative fair use54 and accordingly 
granted SU’s motion for summary judgment on ISC2’s trademark 
infringement claims.55 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 157. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 158. 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012); Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, 823 F.3d at 
158. 
 52. Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC, No. 3:10-cv-
01239(MPS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108853, at *8 (D. Conn. Aug. 7, 2014). 
 53. Id. at *11. 
 54. Id. at *27–28. 
 55. Id. 
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B.  The Second Circuit 
On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s 
summary judgment orders, partially on the grounds that the district 
court erred in applying the three-part nominative fair use test instead 
of the circuit’s traditional likelihood of confusion test.56 The court 
then remanded the case with instructions for the district court to 
supplement the circuit’s traditional likelihood of confusion factors, 
known in the Second Circuit as the “Polaroid factors,”57 with the 
three nominative fair use factors.58 
The Second Circuit made two key holdings that defined its 
adaptation of nominative fair use. First, the Second Circuit distanced 
itself from the Third Circuit by holding that nominative fair use is 
not an affirmative defense.59 In a manner consistent with the Fifth 
Circuit’s approach, the Second Circuit then held that nominative fair 
use should supplement, not replace, a likelihood of confusion test.60 
To support its holding that nominative fair use should not be 
considered an affirmative defense, the Second Circuit noted the 
absence of any mention of nominative fair use in the Lanham Act’s 
list of affirmative defenses and concluded: “If Congress had wanted 
nominative fair use to constitute an additional affirmative defense, it 
would have provided as such.”61 
The Court however conceded that the Polaroid factors are not a 
perfect fit for all cases involving nominative fair use.62 To reconcile 
this apparent incompatibility, the Court emphasized the non-
exclusivity of the Polaroid factors, inferring that supplemental 
nominative fair use considerations are consistent with the circuit’s 
precedent.63 This reasoning reiterated arguments made by the Patent 
and Trademark Office (“PTO”) in an amicus brief that the Court 
 
 56. Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, 823 F.3d at 156. The grounds for vacation 
that were unrelated to nominative fair use are outside the scope of this Comment. 
 57. The “Polaroid” factors are named after the Second Circuit case Polaroid Corp. v. 
Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961), in which the Circuit listed eight of the 
factors courts in the circuit consider when assessing likelihood of confusion. The Polaroid factors 
are analogous to the Ninth Circuit’s “Sleekcraft” factors and the Third Circuit’s “Lapp” factors. 1 
ASTRACHAN ET AL., supra note 13, § 11.02(5)(c)(v). 
 58. Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, 823 F.3d at 156. 
 59. Id. at 167–68. 
 60. Id. at 168. 
 61. Id. at 167. 
 62. Id. at 168. 
 63. Id. at 160 (quoting Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 400 (2d Cir. 
1995)). 
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found persuasive.64 
In its brief, the PTO noted that trademark infringement is often a 
fact-specific issue that does not lend itself well to rigid factor-based 
tests.65 The PTO therefore suggested that “all relevant factors 
probative of likelihood of confusion should be considered” 
including, when relevant, nominative fair use factors.66 The PTO 
considered it unwise to “further cabin” the factors courts use to 
assess likelihood of confusion by replacing traditional, multi-factor 
tests with the three-part nominative fair use test.67 
VI.  ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT TEST 
The following subsections argue that the nominative fair use test 
announced in International Information properly applies the 
doctrine, and should be adopted as the national standard for the 
following reasons: (A) a trademark owner’s statutorily protected 
right in preventing trademark infringement outweighs the common 
law right to engage in comparative advertising; (B) nominative fair 
use is usually unnecessary; (C) nominative fair use is superfluous, 
and; (D) the three-part nominative fair use test does not competently 
address all likelihood of confusion factors. 
A.  A Trademark Owner’s Statutorily Protected Right in Preventing 
Trademark Infringement Outweighs the Common Law Right to 
Engage in Comparative Advertising 
As the Court noted in International Information, nominative fair 
use has no statutory basis.68 On the other hand, infringement claims 
based on a likelihood of confusion are codified in the Lanham Act.69 
When the use of a trademark creates a likelihood of confusion and, 
unlike in New Kids, does fall within the Lanham Act’s purview, the 
only legal justification supporting nominative fair use is a common 
law tradition of condoning comparative advertising that originates in 
pre-Lanham Act case law. 
 
 64. Id. at 167 n.5. 
 65. Brief for Int’l Trademark Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14–15, Int’l 
Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 823 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(No. 14-3456-cv), 2016 WL 6213013. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 15. 
 68. Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc., 823 F.3d at 167. 
 69. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2012). 
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To make nominative fair use, a common law doctrine, an 
affirmative defense to a statutorily created cause of action would be a 
misapplication of legal authority.70 For this reason, the Third Circuit 
errs in treating nominative fair use like an affirmative defense. 
B.  Nominative Fair Use is Usually Unnecessary 
In many nominative fair use cases, traditional likelihood of 
confusion analyses will prove dispositive before a nominative fair 
use discussion becomes necessary. When an alleged infringer uses 
another’s trademark to identify the trademark owner in good faith, 
the alleged infringer is likely trying to distinguish, not confound, the 
origin, source, or sponsorship of her own product. Accurately 
identifying the trademark owner or her product likely eliminates 
much of the consumer confusion relating to the similarity of the two 
parties’ goods. 
In comparative advertising, one of the archetypal nominative 
fair use scenarios, this distinction is made to make the impression 
that the alleged infringer’s goods are somehow superior to the 
trademark owner’s goods.71 In these cases, traditional likelihood of 
confusion analyses would not find likelihood of confusion; rendering 
any subsequent nominative fair use analysis unnecessary. 
C.  Nominative Fair Use is Superfluous 
Perhaps the strongest argument for incorporating nominative fair 
use into a likelihood of confusion analysis is that nominative fair use 
doctrine is merely a restatement of existing trademark law. The right 
to use another’s trademark to reference the trademark owner in a 
non-confusing way was recognized by the Supreme Court long 
before nominative fair use was conceptualized.72 
In Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty,73 the Supreme Court held that a 
defendant perfume producer had the right to repackage the plaintiff’s 
 
 70. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (“[T]he Laws of the United States . . . and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 71. Jacqueline Levasseur Patt, Not All Is Fair (Use) in Trademarks and Copyrights, 
INTABULLETIN: INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N (Sep. 15, 2012), https://www.inta.org/INTABulletin 
/Pages/NotAllIsFair(Use)inTrademarksandCopyrights.aspx.  
 72. See Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 369 (1924). 
 73. 264 U.S. 359 (1924). 
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perfume and could use the plaintiff’s trademark to indicate that the 
plaintiff originally produced the perfume.74 Courts successfully 
implemented the Prestonettes rule regarding referential uses of 
trademarks for over sixty-seven years before “nominative fair use” 
was coined by the Ninth Circuit.75 Indeed, it was this very precedent 
that the Ninth Circuit relied on when it defined nominative fair use: 
[W]e may generalize a class of cases where the use of the 
trademark does not attempt to capitalize on consumer 
confusion or to appropriate the cachet of one product for a 
different one. Such nominative use of a mark—where the 
only word reasonably available to describe a particular 
thing is pressed into service—lies outside the strictures of 
trademark law: Because it does not implicate the source-
identification function that is the purpose of trademark, it 
does not constitute unfair competition; such use is fair 
because it does not imply sponsorship or endorsement by 
the trademark holder. “When the mark is used in a way that 
does not deceive the public we see no such sanctity in the 
word as to prevent its being used to tell the truth.”76 
From this reasoning, it appears as if the Ninth Circuit’s original 
articulation of nominative fair use is best understood as a concise 
reiteration of existing trademark principles rather than a new doctrine 
worthy of independent consideration.77 
Furthermore, traditional, multi-factor likelihood of confusion 
tests address all of the nominative fair use factors and would 
therefore ultimately produce the same result. The three nominative 
fair use factors focus on whether the defendant attempted to 
appropriate any source-identifying function of the mark for its own 
benefit in bad faith.78 Because the defendant’s intent in using the 
allegedly infringing mark is a factor in every federal circuit’s 
likelihood of confusion test,79 these concerns can be addressed in 
 
 74. Id. at 368–69. 
 75. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 76. Id. at 307–08 (quoting Prestonettes, 264 U.S. at 368). 
 77. See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, Inc. v. Loompanics Enters., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 1232, 1241 
(D. Md. 1996) (“While perhaps novel in its precise formulation, the [three-part nominative fair 
use] test is, for the most part, a restatement of two basic principles of trademark law”). 
 78. See Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., 618 F.3d 1025, 
1043 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 79. 2 GILSON LALONDE, supra note 12, § 5.02. 
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detail without a separate nominative fair use analysis. 
This is not to say that traditional likelihood of confusion tests 
are perfectly compatible with nominative fair use cases. For 
example, factors one through four of the Polaroid test—“the strength 
of the plaintiff’s mark,” “the similarity of the marks,” the “proximity 
of the products in the marketplace,” and the likelihood that the 
plaintiff will “bridge the gap”—evaluate the similarity of the marks 
and products being compared.80 If courts were to weigh these factors 
in nominative fair use cases, their persuasive weight would conflict 
with the common law right to comparatively advertise. Without some 
reconciliation, a rigid application of these four Polaroid test factors 
appears incompatible with the nominative fair use doctrine. 
However, a more comprehensive look at Second Circuit case 
law sheds light on how the Second Circuit deals with this 
incompatibility. In the Second Circuit, “the Polaroid factors are 
not . . . ‘exclusive’ and should not be applied ‘mechanically.’ No 
single factor is dispositive, and cases may certainly arise where a 
factor is irrelevant to the facts at hand.”81 
The discretion to consider factors irrelevant on a case-by-case 
basis enables courts in the Second Circuit to consider Polaroid 
factors one through four irrelevant when nominative fair use is at 
issue. Doing so resolves the unfair prejudice these factors would 
otherwise create. 
It is important however for district courts to be thorough when 
explaining why some factors may be irrelevant in certain situations.82 
Doing so facilitates consistent application of the Polaroid factor test 
over time.83 
By failing to require courts in its jurisdiction to at least mention 
all of the jurisdiction’s traditional likelihood of confusion factors, the 
Fifth Circuit errs in missing this opportunity to provide clarity 
 
 80. See Nespresso USA, Inc. v. Afr. Am. Coffee Trading Co., No. 15CV5553-LTS, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71942, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2016) (holding Polaroid factors one through 
four weighed in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion even when nominative fair use was at 
issue). 
 81. Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 823 F.3d 153, 160 
(2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 400 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 82. See Arrow Fastener, 59 F.3d at 399–400 (“The steady application of Polaroid is critical 
to the proper development of trademark law, for it is only when the Polaroid factors are applied 
consistently and clearly over time that the relevant distinctions between different factual 
configurations can emerge.”). 
 83. Id. at 400. 
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through precedent.84 
D.  The Three-Part Nominative Fair Use Test Does Not Competently 
Address All Likelihood of Confusion Factors 
The total encompassment of nominative fair use considerations 
in existing likelihood of confusion tests is, however, not inversely 
true. As previously mentioned, nominative fair use factors are 
predominantly concerned with the intent of the alleged infringer and 
any coinciding bad faith. The Lanham Act, however, defines 
likelihood of confusion in relation to the allegedly infringing use’s 
effect on the consuming public.85 
Jurisdictions that supplant traditional likelihood of confusion 
analyses with nominative fair use tests ignore factors that assess an 
allegedly infringing use’s effect on the consuming public. These 
concerns include: (1) “the proximity of the products and their 
competitiveness with one another,” (2) “sophistication of consumers 
in the relevant market,” and (3) “evidence of actual consumer 
confusion.”86 
1.  The Proximity of the Products and Their  
Competitiveness With One Another 
When assessing likelihood of confusion, the proximity or 
relatedness of the goods at issue is an important factor because the 
more closely the parties’ goods or services are related in the minds of 
consumers, the more likely that consumer confusion will occur.87 
This possible risk of consumer confusion is unaccounted for in the 
three-part nominative fair use test. 
International Information is illustrative. ISC2 was in the 
business of developing standards for the information security 
industry, while SU offered classes that would aid students in meeting 
these standards.88 The complementary nature of the parties’ products 
 
 84. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 546 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The digits 
serve only as guides on the analytical route to the ultimate determination of whether confusion is 
likely to result.”) (quoting Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 
1111, 1122 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
 85. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2012). 
 86. Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, 823 F.3d at 160. 
 87. See Team Tires Plus, Ltd. v. Tires Plus, Inc., 394 F.3d 831, 834 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that “use of a mark on a directly competitive good is more likely to create confusion than 
use of the same mark on a distantly related good . . . .”). 
 88. Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, 823 F.3d at 156. 
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would indicate a close relationship, creating a likelihood of 
confusion.89 By applying only the three-part nominative fair use test 
to the facts of this case, the district court ignored this concern 
entirely. 
2.  The Sophistication of the Buyers 
When likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation is 
alleged, this factor examines whether product characteristics or the 
usual conditions under which the products are bought make it more 
or less likely that the consumers will believe the alleged infringer’s 
product is made or licensed by the plaintiff.90 In this context, greater 
consumer sophistication results in a lesser likelihood of confusion.91 
Generally, low-cost products are associated with lesser consumer 
sophistication and high-cost products are associated with greater 
consumer sophistication.92 
Information security system training sessions at SU are 
multiple-day commitments and currently cost about $1,995 per 
student.93 Consumers in the market for this training are thus likely 
taking great care in purchasing these programs, and are thus 
considered more sophisticated.94 This factor would thus weigh 
against finding likelihood of confusion in International Information. 
This consideration is also not addressed by the three-part nominative 
fair use test. 
3.  Evidence of Actual Confusion 
Evidence of confusion is often considered the most important 
factor in likelihood of confusion analyses,95 and has been treated by 
courts as “persuasive proof” and “dispositive” in this 
determination.96 
The persuasive value of such evidence is intuitive. Evidence of 
 
 89. See Team Tires Plus, 394 F.3d at 834. 
 90. Sports Authority, Inc. v. Prime Hosp. Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 965 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 91. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 92. Id. at 119. 
 93. CISSP Training Class, SECURITY U., http://www.securityuniversity.net/classes_CIS 
SP.php (last visited Mar. 18, 2018). 
 94. See id. 
 95. Michael J. Allen, The Role of Actual Confusion Evidence in Trademark Infringement 
Litigation, 83 THE TRADEMARK REP. 267, 267–68 (1993). 
 96. M2 Software, Inc. v. Madacy Entm’t, 421 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 2005); Lyons P’ship 
v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 804 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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actual confusion is concrete evidence of a trademark’s value 
depreciating because of an infringer’s use of an identical or 
confusingly similar mark, the scenario the Lanham Act was enacted 
to prevent. The three-part nominative fair use test’s failure to 
consider evidence of actual confusion is arguably the test’s most 
egregious shortcoming. 
By using the three-part nominative fair use test, the Ninth 
Circuit fails to account for the foregoing likelihood of confusion 
factors. The Ninth Circuit’s three-part nominative fair use test is thus 
erroneous. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The Second Circuit’s treatment of nominative fair use in 
International Information exemplifies the doctrine’s proper place in 
trademark law. Supplementing likelihood of confusion analyses with 
nominative fair use factors is consistent with the Lanham Act and 
reflects a uniquely comprehensive understanding of the case law that 
supports the nominative fair use doctrine. 
The circuit courts’ disagreement over the proper application of 
nominative fair use calls for Supreme Court guidance. Some of the 
arguments that persuaded the Court to grant certiorari in KP 
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. are applicable 
to this issue. 
Namely, if nominative fair use is applied differently by the 
circuit courts, trademark owners that target a national consumer base 
will potentially avail themselves of jurisdictions with competing 
nominative fair use tests. These trademark owners would have great 
difficulty avoiding liability with ex ante business decisions and 
would “constantly be at risk when developing ad campaigns” if 
nominative fair use is not applied uniformly across the country.97 
Discouraging comparative advertising by allowing this danger to 
persist is against public interest. 
The information conveyed to consumers by comparative 
advertising “encourages product improvement and innovation, and 
can lead to lower prices in the marketplace.”98 Providing clear 
guidance for companies using comparative advertising would foster 
 
 97. Brief for Petitioner at 26, KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impressions, Inc., 543 
U.S. 111 (2004) (No. 03-409). 
 98. 16 C.F.R. § 14.15(c); see also 3 GILSON LALONDE, supra note 5, § 11.08. 
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these public benefits. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Supreme Court should address the 
nominative fair use circuit split and should adopt the Second 
Circuit’s nominative fair use test from International Information. 
